The fraud trial of Charlie Javice and Olivier Amar has become more than just a case of alleged financial misrepresentation—it’s exposing JPMorgan Chase’s negligence in acquiring Frank, the student aid startup. While prosecutors argue that Javice and Amar inflated user numbers to justify the $175 million deal, the defense is revealing a different reality: JPMorgan rushed into this acquisition without verifying key details and is now using fraud allegations as a scapegoat to cover its own mistakes.
Testimony from Wednesday, March 19, 2025, further complicates the fraud narrative. Court records confirm that both Javice and Amar deposited their earnings from the Frank sale into JPMorgan Chase accounts—a move that contradicts the idea that they knowingly engaged in fraud.
One of the most telling pieces of evidence presented during the trial is the financial records showing that Javice and Amar placed their earnings from the Frank acquisition directly into JPMorgan Chase bank accounts.
If Javice and Amar were knowingly committing fraud, why would they store their money in the very bank they allegedly deceived? Typically, fraudsters move illicit gains to institutions beyond their victim’s reach—not directly into the defrauded bank itself.
This fact raises a major question: Did they believe they were committing fraud, or did they assume their actions were completely legitimate? That goes to the entire point of this exercise, was it fraud or a misunderstanding
JPMorgan wasn’t reckless with just a few people reviewing the acquisition—they had an entire team of 350 professionals vetting Frank before finalizing the purchase.
Despite this massive due diligence process, JPMorgan failed to verify whether Frank actually had the millions of student users it claimed.
- The archived version of Frank’s website from JPMorgan’s ownership suggested Frank had 350,000 students, not the 4.25 million cited in the acquisition talks.
- If a 350-person due diligence team missed such an obvious discrepancy, was it really fraud—or just JPMorgan not caring about the details?
- If JPMorgan truly wanted user data, why didn’t they conduct even the most basic verification checks?
These facts point to a more troubling reality: JPMorgan wasn’t actually focused on Frank’s user base—it just wanted the company.
Another key issue is that JPMorgan’s contract to purchase Frank never included, the number of users Frank had, any guarantees about the authenticity of the user database, nor website visitor counts or other performance metrics.
For a tech acquisition allegedly based on user data, this is highly unusual. If JPMorgan was truly buying Frank for its users, why wasn’t this critical data in the contract? The absence of any verification clauses suggests that JPMorgan never prioritized user authenticity.
This raises the question: Can JPMorgan really claim fraud if they never even asked for guarantees about user data in the first place?
JPMorgan Ran a Test on Frank’s User List—Then Ignored the Results
One of the most damning revelations is that JPMorgan actually tested Frank’s user list before finalizing the deal—but never reviewed the results.
- JPMorgan hired a database marketing firm to send emails to a sample of Frank’s users before closing the acquisition.
- If JPMorgan had reviewed the response rates, they could have caught any inconsistencies before paying $175 million.
- Instead, they ignored the results, suggesting they were more focused on acquiring the company than validating its core asset.
If the bank was truly defrauded, why didn’t they look at their own test results before signing the deal?
Why Would Javice Agree to a $10 Million Long-Term Payout If She Were Running a Scam?
Another major contradiction in the fraud narrative is Charlie Javice’s employment contract with JPMorgan, which promised her a $10 million payout after three years. If she knew she was running a scam, why would she agree to a long-term payout? If she knew the scheme would collapse, she would have tried getting all her money upfront. Yet, she structured her deal as if she expected Frank to grow successfully within JPMorgan.
Scammers don’t wait three years to cash out. The structure of her deal suggests that she believed in Frank’s future—not that she was trying to pull off a short-term con.
The “Manipulated” Data Was an Attempt to Build JPMorgan’s Business
The government argues that Frank’s data was manipulated to inflate user numbers. But the defense presents a different explanation. The modifications were not an attempt to deceive JPMorgan—but rather an effort to give JPMorgan a structured customer base for future banking services, because it wasn’t just buying data—they were buying a pipeline of future student customers.
This isn’t about fraud—it’s about JPMorgan’s lack of communication on what they expected and now, damage congtrol.
At the heart of this case is a bigger reality: JPMorgan wasn’t tricked—it failed to do proper due diligence and is now calling it fraud to save face.
The biggest bank in the world had 350 people reviewing the deal—and still missed the alleged fraud. They never included key user data in the contract. They ran a test on the data but ignored the results, and they structured Javice’s compensation as a long-term payout.
Now that the acquisition has gone bad, JPMorgan is calling it fraud to shift blame away from their own mistakes.
This case isn’t just about whether Charlie Javice fabricated user data—it’s about the fact that JPMorgan never actually cared about that data until it became a problem.
As the trial continues, key questions remain. If JPMorgan was buying Frank for its user base, why didn’t they verify the data before closing the deal? Why did they omit user metrics from the contract? Why did they ignore their own test results? And, why did Javice and Amar deposit their money into Chase accounts if they thought they were committing fraud?
JPMorgan wasn’t tricked into this deal—they rushed into it, ignored basic verification steps, and are now using fraud allegations to cover their own mistakes.
As more evidence emerges, the real question is not whether fraud was committed, but whether JPMorgan is simply trying to rewrite history to avoid taking responsibility for a reckless acquisition.
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